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I
INTRODUCTION
The late 1920s and early 1930s saw considerable activity amongst economists concerned
with competitive structures and the "firm".  Much of this work may be interpreted as an attack
on Marshall's treatment of the subject with a view to replacing it by a more "rigorous" and
formal analysis.  But E H Chamberlin to a very large extent stands apart from these
developments, as he makes plain in the "Origin and Early Development of Monopolistic
Competition Theory" (1961).  Serious work on his thesis apparently began in 1924, was
largely completed in 1926, and the study filed in the following year.  This means, for
example, that Chamberlin's "discovery" of the curves of marginal cost and marginal revenue
was made quite independently of his English and German colleagues.  Further, as
Chamberlin himself made clear, "Nor did the Book itself attack Marshall...on any of the
issues involved" (ibid, p 532).  Indeed, he always insisted that his work was an attack "not on
Marshall but on the theory of perfect competition" (ibid, p 540).  He might have added that
Monopolistic Competition is essentially Marshallian both in its style of reasoning and in the
pre-occupation with realism; a pre-occupation which led Chamberlin to play down the
operational significance of the marginal curves while recognising their importance in a
technical sense (1957, p 274-6).
In contrast to the origins of Joan Robinson's Imperfect Competition, Chamberlin cited three
empirical sources of inspiration.  First, the "Taussig-Pigou controversy as to whether
charging what the market will bear in railway rates was to be explained in terms of
monopolistic discrimination or in terms of joint costs" (1961, p 517).  Secondly, he drew
attention to the "literature of business" and especially to the stimulus provided by Allyn
Young.  As Chamberlin recalled, Young had given particular attention to trade marks and2
patents in so far as they conferred a monopoly power which is also consistent with
competition:
"Each makes a product unique in certain respects; this is its monopolistic aspect.  Each
leaves room for other commodities almost but not quite like it; this is its competitive aspect"
(quoted by Chamberlin, ibid, p 525).
For Chamberlin, this perspective "became the key to the whole analysis" (ibid, p 526); a new
"way of looking at the economic process" (1948, p 204).
A third source of stimulus was located in "business economics" with special reference to
advertising and the operation of retail markets (1961, p 529).  Here Chamberlin drew
attention to Pigou's perception that advertising was peculiar to what was in effect
monopolistic competition, and to Marshall's distinction between "constructive" and
"combative" advertising.
II
Chamberlin's main interest was in that situation where the pairing of buyers and sellers was
no longer random: that is, where goods are differentiated in the mind of the consumer.  Here
the firm may control price, product specification and selling costs where the latter are
"incurred to alter the position or shape of the demand curve" (1948, p 117).  The problems
which are exposed by such a perspective are wide ranging so that it is important to note that
Chamberlin concerned himself at the outset almost solely with intra rather inter-industry
competition and that he retained something very like the Marshallian industry in so doing.
As he put it:3
"The group contemplated initially is one which has ordinarily been regarded as composing
one imperfectly competitive market: a number of automobile manufacturers, or producers of
pots and pans, magazine publishers, or of retail shoe dealers" (ibid, p 81).
Even this restricted perspective, however, meant that the technical apparatus had to be
altered as compared to the treatment of pure competition.  The firm now has a choice of cost
curve arising from the capacity to alter product specification (ibid, pp 94-100) while in
addition selling costs have to be added to costs of production.  Chamberlin thought that it
would be difficult to generalise about the curve of selling costs since its shape would be
affected by the nature of the product, the level of planned expenditure, and the choice of
media, but gave it a "U" shape in both short and long run (ibid, pp 133-5, 138).
Perhaps the most important innovation resulted from Chamberlin's appreciation of the point
that:
"A monopoly of Lucky Strikes does not constitute a monopoly of cigarettes, for there is no
degree of control whatever over the supply of other substitute brands" (ibid, p 65).
He thus introduced two revenue curves.  The DD curve is defined as the fractional part of
the Market Demand curve (eg, for cigarettes) and "shows the demand for the product of any
one seller at various prices on the assumption that his competitors' prices are always
identical with his" (ibid, p 90).
In contrast, the dd curve provides "a rough index of buyers' preferences for the product of
one seller over that of another" (ibid, p 93) and indicates the "increase in sales which he
could realise by cutting his price provided others did not also cut theirs" (ibid, p 90).  In the
context of the large group, the relatively elastic (as compared to DD) dd curve is relevant
since it is legitimate to assume that any adjustment "by a single producer spreads its4
influence over so many of his competitors that the impact felt by any one of them is
negligible" (ibid, p 83) – ie the diffusion effect.
To ease the task of exposition, Chamberlin proceeded under the "heroic" assumption that
both demand and cost curves for all products " are uniform throughout the group" (ibid, p 82)
thus permitting the use of a single set of revenue and cost functions - and further
heightening the misleading impression that the reader confronts a minor variation of the
earlier treatment of pure competition.
But methodologically, the technique is classically Marshallian in that Chamberlin assumed
price and product, product and selling costs, selling costs and price to be given, before
allowing the third element in each case to vary (ibid, chapters 5 and 7).   In fact, Chamberlin
spent a great deal of time in discussing product variation and selling costs although there is
little doubt that the analysis of price adjustment attracted most attention from later
commentators.  But the procedure is familiar: if the typical seller faces a dd curve which is
consistent with excess profits, new entry will force the curve to a position of tangency with
the cost curve (PP) thus yielding an equilibrium under conditions of decreasing costs – a
variant of the Sraffa solution (1953).  While Chamberlin makes allowance for changes in the
position of the cost curve in consequence of new entry, an interesting example is where
numbers are assumed constant and excess profits obtain.  In this case, the (unintended)
consequences for each seller seeking to cut price with a view to maximising profit, is a
general reduction in the market price so that dd "slides" down DD until the position of
tangency is reached.  Equilibrium is defined by two conditions:
"(a) dd' must be tangent to PP', and
(b) DD' must intersect both dd' and PP' at the point of tangency" (ibid, p 93).5
However, the emphasis on tangency obscures the real purpose, and one must sympathise
with Chamberlin's repeated complaint that this solution had come to be regarded as "the
central principle involved" (ibid, p 195).  In fact, Chamberlin recognised that decisions on
cost, price, and selling outlay were closely linked, and therefore that the cost and revenue
functions facing the firm were interdependent.  The reader is, in fact, presented with a
market situation where change is endogenous, in part the result of firms seeking positions of
advantage for themselves, so that in practice the "result is heterogeneity of prices, and
variation over a wide range of outputs (scales of production) and in profits" (ibid, p 81) which
are unlikely to be completely eliminated even in a competitive environment.
Figure 1 (1948, p91)
III
DUOPOLY
However, to the modern reader as for Chamberlin himself, the third chapter on "Duopoly and
Oligopoly" (which also figured in the thesis, pp 63-96) should be among the most interesting.
The material was first published in the Quarterly Journal for 1929.  Chamberlin was obliged6
to strike out the reference to "oligopoly" at the insistence of F W Taussig, the then editor,
who "thought the term a monstrosity" (1957, p33); a decision which must have cost the
author some pain since he was unaware at that time of any prior use of the term in print.
Chamberlin fared better at the hands of later generations.  Romney Robinson, for example,
insisted that the introduction of the analysis of oligopoly was to be regarded as the most
important contribution of a writer who "almost single-handedly introduced the concept …and
forced it to the attention of economists" (1971, p 63).  Bain concurred (1964, p 29).
It would be inappropriate here to review the extensive history of duopoly theory or even the
treatment which Chamberlin accorded to the subject in his third chapter (and Appendix A
which deals with "Mathematical Theories of Duopoly and Oligopoly").  However, it is
appropriate to note that the Cournot model (1838) of two sellers offering an identical product
is arguably the most important at least for didactic purposes.
Basically, Chamberlin reviewed a case where the sellers were interdependent but pursued
policies with regard to price or output on the assumption that their rival's reaction would
remain unchanged - the case of mutual dependence ignored.  In both cases (price and
output), Chamberlin confirmed that the outcome would be determinate and accord with the
situation which would have obtained under competitive conditions.  The case of mutual
dependence recognised was the more interesting to Chamberlin, and here he drew
attention to the use of the chess analogy as used by Pigou (1957, p 38) and earlier by Irving
Fisher, in "Cournot and Mathematical Economics", in the Quarterly Journal for 1898 (1948,
p 46n).  The dependence recognised case, as Chamberlin reports the matter, was also
consistent with a determinate result, namely the monopoly solution, and was associated with
Young in his review of Bowley's Mathematical Groundwork of Economics published in the
Journal of the American Statistical Association for 1925 (1948, p 47 and n).7
Writing in 1957 Chamberlin was to argue that:
"Everyone sought the solution, and I can recall no hint of my own general position that the
problem is a manifold one with a large number of different answers depending on which of
many possible assumptions are made" (1957, p 36).
Chamberlin's own results were usefully summarised on pp 53-4 of the original publication
and were stated in this form:
1. Duopoly is not one problem, but several.  The solution varies, depending upon the
conditions assumed.  Putting to one side the factor of uncertainty, it is (with minor
exceptions) determinate for each set of assumptions made.
2. If sellers have regard to their total influence upon price, the price will be the monopoly
one.
3. If sellers neglect their indirect influence upon price, each determining his policy as
though his competitors were uninfluenced by what he did, the results vary...
4. If sellers neglect both their indirect and direct influence upon price, the outcome will be
the purely competitive price, regardless of numbers.
5. Uncertainty, where present, as to (a) whether other competitors will hold their amounts or
their prices constant, (b) whether they are far sighted, (c) the extent of the possible
incursions upon their markets, and (d), in the case of a time lag, its length, renders the
outcome indeterminate."
In Chamberlin's view, the "real problem" was the development of the dependence
recognised case and the exploration of the consequences of uncertainty (1957, p 38).8
IV
Oligopoly
Seen against this background, Chamberlin's treatment of the small group case of
monopolistic competition was no less dramatic at the time of writing, particularly since the
argument brought to the fore a problem which is implicit in the large group case (with its
interdependent functions) – that of determinancy.  Building on the analysis of chapter 3
Chamberlin argued that the particular outcome would depend on the behavioural
assumptions made.  The monopoly (Figure 1) solution will obtain if each seller "sought to
maximise his profit with regard to his full influence, direct and indirect, upon the situation"
(1948, p 100), ie, at point Q in the figure.  The competitive solution will obtain "if sellers
neglect their indirect influence upon the price, each assuming the others to be unaffected by
his own actions" but forcing a reaction which results in each firm arriving at the point  R.
The most probable solution (dependence recognised) might be expected within these
extremes (with dd lying at a point intermediate between Q and R) but with its stability
affected by uncertainty:
"The same elements of uncertainty are present here as under the simpler hypothesis of a
standardised product…  Each seller may be in doubt as to his rival's policy, and therefore as
to his own, because he does not know (a) whether, if his rival's present policy continues, it
will continue with respect to his price or with respect to his output, (b) how intelligent and far-
seeing his rival is, and (c) how large would be the incursions made upon him by his own
price cut.  This last factor is augmented by a new unknown – the extent of the buyer's
preferences for his own product over others, expressed by the shape of the demand curves
for individual products" (ibid, p 101).
But concentration on an identifiable range within which a solution may be found (such as
RQ in the figure) is itself misleading, depending as it does on the "heroic" assumptions which9
are not a necessary feature of the model.  The material point is that there are as many
solutions as there are behavioural assumptions to be made – all in the context of a situation
where the demand curves in question are essentially "imagined" ones (since their
anticipated shape depends upon judgments as to the future reaction of rivals) and where the
cost curves may differ in both location and shape (cf Sweezy).
However, Chamberlin did offer a number of general conclusions in the context of this market
type.  He clearly believed that "dependence recognised" was the probable case and that this
would tend to be supported by tacit or formal agreements especially as regards price (ibid, p
106).  He also considered that price would be relatively stable and based upon an
approximation of the full cost principle:
"business men may set their prices with reference to costs rather than to demand, aiming at
ordinary rather than at maximum profits, and more or less taking it for granted that they will
continue to enjoy about their usual share of the total business.  They take whatever business
comes their way and expect others to do likewise - to live and let live" (ibid, p 105).
Further, Chamberlin drew attention in this context to "disguised" price cuts and to non-price
competition generally (ibid, pp 107ff).  Two additional points are deserving of attention.
First, Chamberlin noted that the situation was consistent with conflict; with the attempt by
firms to drive rivals from the market.  This example makes, in effect, the important point that
price-cutting is not always the "irrational" behaviour that the dependence ignored case,
taken in isolation, might at first sight suggest (1948, pp 92-3).
Secondly, he argued that dependence recognised does not of itself involve collusion (ibid, p
106).  As he noted elsewhere, "this is a legitimate solution of oligopoly, consistent with10
complete independence of the sellers"; a point which carried with it some important policy
implications.
"If a chess player decides against a particular move because the response to it which his
rival would make would be damaging to him, he cannot be accused of 'spontaneous co-
operation'; and he should hardly be required by the rules to make the move on the ground
that otherwise he would be entering into a 'conspiracy in restraint of chess'; or into an
agreement with his rival.  Why, then, should a businessman who acts with equal (and rather
ordinary) intelligence in deciding not to make a price cut, be accused (either by economists
or by attorneys general) of collusion, or of tacitly co-operating with someone? The point is
that the idea of co-operation in any sense is unnecessary to the result" (1957, p 39).
Oligopoly, as a small group case, was one thing: oligopolistic interdependence another.
V
Oligopolistic Interdependence: Space
Chamberlin always recognised, as Wicksell had done (Schneider, in Kuenne, 1967, pp 139-
40) that the issue of location "has been held in undue isolation from the rest of economics"
and that "spatial differentiation is the general rule" (1957, p 6).  The problem of spatial
competition was in fact central to the analysis contained in Chamberlin's thesis, as submitted
to Harvard, featuring as it does (in chapter 4, section 2) "Spatial Differentiation" pp 105-9,
and again in chapter 5, sections 2 and 3 ("Pure Spatial Competition", pp 167-84; "Spatial
Monopoly and Urban Rent", pp 289-301).  But in the published version, the bulk of this
material was relegated to two appendices.  Appendix C is based upon the second section of
chapter 4, but updated to include a critique of Hotelling's article "Stability in Competition" as
published in the Economic Journal (31, 1929).  Appendix D is an edited version of section
6 of chapter 5.11
Chamberlin later admitted that the issue of spatial competition had been more marked as a
feature of the thesis as compared to the book, and announced his intention to give the
matter more prominence in his "Monopolistic Competition Revisited" (1951, reprinted 1957),
and in the article on "The Product as an Economic Variable" (1953; 1957).  But the material
was not returned to the main text.
Yet Chamberlin did confront the problem which is presented by spatially distributed firms,
which may be members of a large group operating under conditions of monopolistic
competition.  For example, retail stores or filling stations, may form a network of interwoven
markets.  A (retail) seller of petrol may cut price to a limited extent, forcing adjacent rivals to
make some response.  A more extensive cut, on the other hand, could force a like response
from rivals within the relevant area and hence from those who are on the boundary of
neighbouring areas - the "chain linking effect", which suggests that even if the numbers
selling physically similar (or, indeed, identical) products are large, consideration of indirect
influence may enter in when account is taken of location.
To clarify the point, Chamberlin later commented on the phenomenon of the "isolated
monopolist" who is not subject to repercussions in that when he cuts price "he makes his
gains from a large number of others, so that no one of them is appreciably affected by what
he does" (1957, p 54) - a condition (isolation) which can also be extended to pure
competition (ibid, p 56).  This case was contrasted with the non-isolated seller (ibid, p 57),
covering "the problem commonly known as oligopoly" and also the relationships between
firms which are likely to obtain when allowance is made for spatial distribution.
But the specific problem in which Chamberlin became increasingly interested was the one
posed by Kaldor who was concerned with the problem of competition between quite
different products sold in different places.  Kaldor cited the case of demand for cigarettes in12
a given location being more affected by the price of beer in the same location than by the
price of cigarettes in a distant place - thus rendering the demand curves indeterminate
(1934, p 340; 1953, p 40).  In noting the problems involved, Chamberlin recognised the
possible applications of the model of price discrimination (which had been mentioned in the
thesis but not the book (1961, p 519; cf, Phlips, 1983).  At the same time, he also came to
believe that the "subject needs to be re-written in terms of that extremely useful concept
which originated, I believe, with Mr Kaldor, of cross elasticity of demand, rather than in terms
of the number of sellers in a market" (1957 , p 61).
The full implications of this perspective are best summarised by Chamberlin himself.  As
compared to the original version:
"The present formulation is much simpler.  It begins with the individual seller and uses the
spatial example to illustrate how the entire economic system may be viewed as an elaborate
network of inter-related firms, each one being able to adjust from the beginning either its
price, product, or selling outlay.  The uniformity assumption is used only momentarily, and
diversity appears at once in the form of concentration of buyers.  The individual firm is either
isolated or related oligopolistically to others.  The group has disappeared from the
formulation here given, and with it the concept of large numbers, since the individual seller in
this latter instance is again correctly described as isolated, even in the special case of pure
competition" (Ibid, p 68).
Little of the formal structure of Monopolistic Competition would appear to survive, even if
there had been no change in Chamberlin's understanding of the characteristics of the market
as a type.
However, Chamberlin had no compelling reason to drop the concept of the group ("if it had
meant an industry, the word industry would have been used", 1957, p 68n) or sub-group13
(1948, pp 102-3) in the context of small numbers.  There are as a matter of fact "industries"
as the term is ordinarily understood (1948, p 81) composed of a small number of identifiable
firms, such as automobiles, and which provide classic examples of oligopoly as Chamberlin
originally defined the term.  What Chamberlin did was to generalise the model along the
lines suggested in the first edition.  He also added a concern with the oligopolistic
relationship which emerges as soon as the diffusion assumption is dropped; a point which
is particularly relevant when spatial considerations are introduced and other forms of
differentiation are present.
What Chamberlin had done was gradually to widen his understanding of "sources of
influence" notably as a result of introducing the problem of spatial distribution both of
customers and firms.  This in turn led to an appreciation not just of oligopoly but of the
phenomenon of oligopolistic interdependence, thus giving a new meaning to the original
claim:
...it seems evident to me that oligopolistic elements are very general in the economic system
and that economic study must be increasingly concerned with their influence upon prices
and other economic categories (1948, p 61).
In short, we face an economic system (not just a single model) which is characterised by
interdependence and thereby by uncertainty and conjecture.  The "imagined curves"
confronting the oligopolistic firm have implications for the treatment of input analysis (1948,
chapter 8; cf, Skinner, 1981) while the situation is further complicated by Chamberlin's belief
that in the labour market the characteristic relationship was that of bilateral monopoly (1957,
chapter 12).14
In such situations there is no clearly definable path to equilibrium; indeed, as Brian Loasby
has noted, "in this fog of ignorance, there is no equilibrium" (1976, p 189).  Writing in 1961
Chamberlin noted that he could:
...see no escape (and no reason to try to escape) from the conclusion that the ubiquitous
forces of oligopoly and of non-price competition (to name only these) must be responsible for
many loose ends, multiple optima and indeterminateness in one sense or another in
"groups" and in the system (1961, p 539).
What we have to avoid is the temptation "of formulating problems with the objective of
assuring a determinate result" (1957, p 62).
VI
Conclusion
Chamberlin spent a great deal of time in the 30-plus years after his book was first published
in seeking to differentiate his "product" from that of Mrs Robinson and for good reason.  Yet
in a sense, his effort was misdirected.  It is quite clear from the thesis, from the book, from
the appendices which were gradually added, and from the articles published in collected
form in 1957, that his thinking in this field had progressively developed in a positive way.
The "manifesto" of 1951 and the retrospective review of 1961 amply testify to his intentions.
Yet the book was never re-written in a way which would have reflected the evolving plan with
the result that the reader was left to re-interpret the original, in the light of later
developments, and to alter the weighting to be attached to its component parts.
In retrospect it is now clear that Chamberlin intended his readers to attach different
meanings to his treatment of oligopoly and of oligopolistic interdependence as compared to
those which might have been ascribed to them when first perusing the Theory.15
Chamberlin used the phrase "a re-orientation of the theory of value, when describing the
purpose behind his work but in practice the implications were more profound.  In the world
described by Chamberlin we confront a situation where firms effectively compete by
changing the conditions which confront their rivals; they compete through the introduction of
new products or the manipulation of demand conditions to create positions of advantage for
themselves (1948, p 213) against a background of imperfect knowledge.  Here the causes of
change are endogenous so that in a sense the argument invites attention to the problem of
disequilibrium as a special and essential feature of the economic process.  It is hardly
surprising that Chamberlin should have likened his own position to that of Schumpeter
(1957, pp 62-63).  Elsewhere he observed that "certain features of monopolistic competition
would indicate that it is necessarily a theory of change to be associated with dynamics rather
than with circular flows" (op cit, p 225).
The result was not so much the re-orientation, as the wreckage, of the theory of value in the
sense that we can no longer work in terms of unambiguous relationships between demand,
supply and price or even identify equilibrium positions (Shackle, 1967, p 27).  Shackle
added:
"When economic theory elects to bring in imperfect competition and to recognise
uncertainty, there is an end to the meaning of general equilibrium.  Economics thereafter is
the description, piece by piece, of a collection of fragments.  These fragments may fit
together into a brilliant, arrestingly suggestive mosaic, but they do not compose a pattern of
unique, inevitable order" (op cit, p 295).
Yet as Shackle recognised, generalisation is still possible when based on a study of the
market type of the kind offered, for example, by Rothschild (1947) who based his
argument on analogies drawn from Clausewitz, rather than of Newton.  In a notable article,16
Rothschild was able to conclude, inter alia, that "price rigidity is an essential aspect of
normal oligopolistic price strategy" (1953, p. 455) and that "oligopolistic circumstances
lead to a multitude of conditions surrounding the quoted price" (op cit, p 456).
This is the direction in which Chamberlin wished to move the discussion so that Georgescu-
Roegen was surely correct in emphasising his concern with "the analysis of the actual" (in
Kuenne, 1967, p 38).  The point has been widely made in the literature, notably by Galbraith
(1948, pp 104, 107) and J S Bain (in Kuenne, 1967, pp 152ff).  In an interesting monograph
on Chamberlin, Romney Robinson noted that he had "pushed the whole of price analysis a
major step towards that descriptive realism which had been so sadly lacking in post-
Marshallian theory" (1971, p 42).  He added that: "Chamberlin's monopolistic competition
theory can fairly be described as an attempt to interpret more fully the world which Marshall
discussed" (op cit, p 10).  In the same vein, Dennis O'Brien has drawn attention to the
Marshallian style of the work, notably in connection with Chamberlin's reliance on average,
rather than on marginal, curves (1982, pp 14, 18).  In Chamberlin's own words, his book
"contains not a technique, but a way of looking at the economic system" (1948, p 204); in
effect, a return to the perspective supplied by Marshall's Industry and Trade but by a
circuitous and demanding route.  The response, in short, is a reminder of the value of the
"institutionalist" approach: and of the importance of space.
*The argument of this paper is based upon, but does not replace, analyses contained in
previous attempts to deal with Chamberlin's Monopolistic Competition.  They include
"Oligopoly and the Theory of the Firm" (with M C Maclennan) in Economic Analysis in
Historical Perspective, ed D P O'Brien and J Creedy (London, Butterworths, 1984).  "The
Origins and Development of Monopolistic Competition" and  "Edward Chamberlin: the
Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the Theory of Value", both in the
Journal of Economic Studies, ed F H Stephen, vol 10, pp 52-67 (1983) and vol 13, (1986),
pp 27-44.  The present version of the argument is prompted by a reading of Chamberlin's17
original thesis, and by an invitation to contribute to a volume in honour of a notable
"institutionalist".
The chapter contains an abridgement and re-arrangement of the materials published in the
Journal of Economic Studies with a view to emphasising Chamberlin's interest in the issue
of the spatial distribution of customers and firms, while also serving as an introduction to a
section of the original thesis, here reproduced as an appendix.
"Pure Spatial Competition" formed part of the text of Chamberlin's thesis, as recorded at
pages 167-84.  This material was the basis of appendix C of the published work but is
reprinted here in its original form.
Many years ago, when I hoped to visit the Chamberlin archive, his daughter, Mrs Oakes
Spaulding (Monique Chamberlin), gave me permission to use his papers.  The appendix is
published, courtesy of the Harvard University Press.  The numbering of the notes, and the
pagination, has been altered.18
PURE SPATIAL COMPETITION
The problem of pure spatial competition is defined very simply, although the full implications
of the hypothesis which is required may not be appreciated until actual development of the
theory is undertaken.  Just as a seller's market is large or small depending on the price he
sets, so it varies with the location he chooses.  People not only buy where prices are
cheapest; they also trade at the store which is most conveniently located.  The analysis of
prices ordinarily assumes that other bases of competition than that of price "remain equal"; it
is now proposed to assume that prices and everything else but location "remain equal", while
merchants attempt to secure a market for themselves solely by the wise selection of their
place of business.  The problem is to ascertain by isolating this single factor, its significance
in helping to explain the whole complex competitive process.
Spatial competition is a vital type, but one whose effects are worked out slowly.  Merchants
already in business do not ordinarily (although they do sometimes) shift their locations; as
they change their prices or the quality of their goods, in competing with one another.  But old
stores go out of business and new ones become established.  In this way the arrangement
of the selling area is gradually changed and we can determine the norm by asking what
arrangement would result if the mobility were perfect and frictionless.
The moving force in establishing any arrangement will clearly be the attempt on the part of
the sellers to find the location which promises the largest market – the greatest volume of
sales.  But before examining the outcome of a struggle of this kind, in which locations may
be constantly changing, let us see how the trade of the entire area would be divided among
the sellers at any one time or for any given arrangement of stores.  The market for any one
seller would be perfectly determinate.  Those to whom he was most convenient would trade
with him, either through deliberate, rational calculation and comparison between the
advantages of purchasing there and elsewhere, or simply through their naturally entering the19
nearest shop without giving any thought to the matter.  If two or three stores were of exactly
the same convenience for a buyer, he would presumably divide his custom between them,
for, under our assumptions, he is uninfluenced by habit, and would not feel its cumulative
force in compelling him to continue a customer of the one he happened to patronize first.
Even if we permit habit to enter in here, each store would have an equal chance at securing
his initial and hence his later business.
The division of the whole area into separate markets is illustrated by Figure 11, a map in
which the dots represent stores and the lines delimit the market of each.
1  "X" indicates the
location of a new store and the dotted lines the market which it would take away from those
already  established.   The   diagram   must   be  taken  as  symbolic  only,  for  the  vagaries
                                               
1 Cf Fetter's analysis of the spatial factor.  (Economic Principles, p 392 ff)20
of streets make it impossible to measure distance from residence to store in a straight line.
2
Again, strictly speaking, the map allocates buyers to a particular market on the assumption
that each buyer can be represented by a dot at one place on the area.  This is accurate only
where a buyer starts out from his residence for the sole purpose of making purchases.  As
he goes to and from his work, his amusement or any other pursuits, his "location" changes
and many of his purchases may be made at stores more convenient to his travels than to his
residence.  The diagram is incapable of showing accurately such forces as these.  But it is
helpful in indicating that the buyers within the whole area do not patronise sellers at random,
but with reference to their proximity.
3
Now, if the distribution of population and of stores were given, this would be the end of the
analysis.  Since, other things being equal, buyers will patronise the most convenient seller, it
follows at once that for any given arrangement of buyers and sellers every merchant will
have a determinate market.  But what determines the arrangement?  We have still to inquire
to what degree and according to what principles there is adaptation of this part of the
economic system to the wants of the people – their wants for convenience.  If a merchant
can increase his sales by changing his location, he will do so.  Is there any tendency towards
a stable equilibrium in the sense of an arrangement where no one would be able to better his
position by a change?  How are tendencies towards concentration and towards dispersion to
be explained and what is their effect on site rents?  In general, the more stores there are, the
smaller the volume of business for each one.  How many will there be, and is there any
tendency for the "most efficient size" or for any other size to be established?
                                               
2 In this connection, it is often true that certain streets are devoted exclusively to business purposes,
others to residential purposes.  In a large city, for instance, the north and south streets may contain
stores, those running east and west, residences or apartment houses.
3 Wherever the phrase "distribution of population" is used hereafter, it will refer not simply to the
distribution of residences, but to the distribution of routes as well, and will take into account all the
complex forces here implied.  For instance, there is a "concentration of population" in this sense in the
"shopping district".21
The central problem lies in the adaptation of the distribution of stores and the distribution of
population to each other.  Little or nothing can be done with the question of size under our
assumptions, for it depends on the relation between cost and the uniform price assumed to
be charged by all producers.  This price depends on the degree of importance buyers attach
to convenience - the more they are willing to pay for it, the smaller will be the stores and the
more dense will be their distribution.  The forces affecting size will be considered below
(Sections 3 and 4), where it will be shown that the scale of production is inevitably smaller
than that which is most efficient.  For the time being, then, we must accept provisionally the
idea of a kind of normal size, leaving the question of what determines it until later.
The distribution of buyers to which the location of stores would roughly conform would be
quite different if convenience were the only factor buyers had to consider in making their
purchases.  The striking concentration of population in the "shopping district" (not in the
sense that people live there, of course, but in the sense that they come there in large
numbers) would not be present, for there would be no shopping district.  "Shopping" -
inspecting the wares and prices of several stores before purchasing - is necessary only
because there are other differences between goods than those pertaining to their
accessibility, and because these differences have to be investigated.  The existence of a
district where "shopping goods" are sold economises the shoppers' time.  But such a district
would not exist if standardisation made inspection and comparison unnecessary.  More
conveniently located stores would drive those in the shopping district out of business.
Although due, fundamentally, to the fact that goods are not standardised, this concentration
of buyers, once begun, is cumulative for other reasons.  To those who go to the district to
purchase must be added those who go there to work.  Goods which are habitually
purchased at the nearest store without "shopping", may be sold in the shopping district or on22
the way to and from it because the people are there, and once there, want to buy other
things conveniently.
If all goods were standardised, buyers would be loathe to visit a distant shopping district to
secure them.  The "population" would then be more dispersed. and stores dealing in all kinds
of goods would adapt their locations accordingly.  Any big department store now located in
the shopping district could secure for itself a larger market as well as a saving in rent by
moving to a spot more remote from its competitors.  Here it would be assured of all the
business of the surrounding territory to which it was more convenient.  The tendency would
be towards dispersion rather than concentration.  And just as the concentration of population
in the shopping district is cumulative, so its dispersion would be cumulative.  As stores
became more scattered the routes of the people trading with them and working in them
would be more evenly distributed.  This would lead in its turn to a still more even distribution
of stores.
It is not meant to imply that stores of all kinds would be sprinkled here and there with no
concentration whatever.  Stores of different types would be grouped, for it would suit the
convenience of purchasers if, on one buying trip, they could make all of their purchases in
the same vicinity.  If we apply the reasoning to a kind of "general merchandise store" which
would sell almost everything (and which might easily develop under such conditions), the
general conclusion is that such stores would be fairly evenly dispersed.  If we apply it to
stores dealing in a certain type or class of goods as book stores, or shoe stores, the
conclusion is that stores of any type would be fairly evenly dispersed and that stores of
different types would tend to be gathered into groups which would be roughly equi-distant
from each other.
Let us examine the adaptation of stores to population more carefully.  For a given distribution
of population would there be a determinate distribution of stores?  With perfect mobility the23
answer is no.  There would exist no arrangement at which it would not be to the advantage
of some one to change his location (corresponding to the equilibrium under pure competition
where it is to the advantage of no one to change his output).
The indeterminateness of location can be Illustrated in a simple case.  Suppose the selling
area to be as in Fig. 12, and divided equally among seven sellers.  Any of the six outer
sellers could enlarge his market by moving towards the centre and forcing the unfortunate
one in that position to share with him.  Let us suppose that they were all to follow this policy.
Fig 12 Fig 13
When they had each moved half way, the markets would be arranged as in Fig 13, the
encircled dot in each case showing the new location.  Each one except the middle one would
have his old market plus a part of the middle area.  But the movement could not stop until
they had all reached the centre, whereupon the seven of them would share the entire area
equally as before.  There would be no separate markets, to be sure, but the total business
would be divided about equally, since there would be no reason for buyers selecting one
seller over another.  Here, however, any one of them could secure more than one-seventh
by moving away from the centre again.  And so the oscillation would continue.  The sellers
might combine at the centre and set up one large store, but ,with competition on the basis of
location alone this would be useless.  Competitors would appear at once to share in the24
gains and they could secure markets by simply setting themselves up in appropriate
locations.
Of course, the actual stability of store locations, because of the immobility of capital, makes
the very idea of continuous oscillation seem absurd.  The actual arrangement is highly
stable, since the problem of location imposes itself on a merchant, broadly speaking, only
when he first sets himself up in business and at rare intervals thereafter.  The fundamental
instability of the system, however, is insignificant.  It reveals itself in differences of rent and
profits (due also, of course, to many other causes) rather than in constant movement which
would wipe out these differences as soon as they appeared.
The conclusion of ultimate instability involves that at any one time, although stores as a
whole are scattered, they may be scattered very unevenly. The forces pictured in the
example by which we have illustrated instability might make for concentration in small
groups or for an even distribution or for something in between.  There could be no very
considerable concentration because of its great inconvenience to buyers compared to a
number of smaller scattered centres.
But immobility not only makes the actual situation stable,  no matter how arranged.  It also
makes for even dispersion where population is fairly evenly distributed.  If several sellers are
gathered together, any one is in a particularly vulnerable position.  In Fig 12, if all seven
sellers are in the centre, six newcomers, taking the outer positions, can force them to fail or
incur the expense and loss of moving.  If seven sellers is the number which can most
advantageously serve the district, the newcomers are now in a better position to survive than
the original seven.  If they had chosen the scattered locations in the first place, there would
have been nothing to attract others to compete with them. Immobility will thus lead
merchants to seek the locations in the first place which give the greatest protection to the25
spatial monopoly they seek, and each seller is best protected when they are evenly
distributed.
The reaction of other bases of competition on spatial monopoly is another factor making for
dispersion.  The closer are two competitors, the more nearly are they on a par, and the less
secure is the market of each from the encroachments of the other by price cuts or other
methods.  The slight spatial advantage over a larger number of purchasers, gained, perhaps,
by locating closer to a competitor, may be less desirable than a more secure advantage over
a smaller number which is to be had by isolating oneself.  To be isolated is to be protected to
a degree from other means of competition, of course, the final decision as to location must
turn on the nature of the good, the various ways in which it can be and is differentiated from
others, and the relative importance of convenience as a factor in its purchase.  But in
general, whereas the arrangement might be indeterminate if location were absolutely the
only basis for competition, the introduction of other bases makes it more likely that sellers
will be dispersed.  For the market of any one is as large in either case, and better protected
from other types of competition if spatial differentiation is carried as far as possible.
By contrast, there seem to be no forces making for concentration, under our assumptions,
unless there be also a concentration of population.  This is especially significant where
population is more dense in the sense that particular streets or street intersections are
travelled by people in large numbers in their daily goings and comings (other than for
purposes of buying).  Here the outcome depends on the degree of concentration.  If there is
room enough, the result will simply be more stores of the same size and rate of profits, and
paying the same rent.  Any merchant securing a larger volume of business and larger profits
would be forced to share his market with competitors who would locate nearby.  This
competition would force the same volume of business as was secured in less densely
populated districts, and there could be no rent above that which the land would yield for26
residential or other purposes, since the location would yield no greater market than any
other.
But the concentration may be very great in an area so small that there is not room for all the
competitors who would naturally be attracted.  The levelling effect of competition on profits
and the resulting tendency towards a uniform scale of production is then restricted by the
impossibility of piling stores on top of each other.  Competitors would be unable to make
incursions upon the larger markets afforded to those who secured locations in the district.
But they could prevent them from enjoying the increased profits arising from a larger scale of
production and diminished unit costs-profits which are ordinarily eliminated by an increase in
the number of stores.  Their competitive bidding for the sites would force these gains into the
hands of the landowners In the form of rent.  It seems unlikely, however, that this tendency
would be very important under purely spatial competition because of the fairly even
distribution of population.
There  would be variations in size, in rents, and in profits from another cause, which is
closely allied to concentration - unevenness in the distribution of population, not in the sense
of the existence of certain areas where it is on the whole more dense but in the sense that
the markets fit into each other in a highly irregular fashion.  It has already been remarked
that the arrangement of Fig 11 (page 00) is symbolic only.  The vagaries of streets and the
fact that a retail store does not occupy an infinitesimally small space characteristically make
it impossible to divide a selling area into equal markets. This irregularity reveals itself in
several ways.  If a particular corner is passed by 8,000 people a day, it gives a better market
than the nearest possible location (next door, but not on the corner) where 5,000 people
pass daily.  Other things being equal, its sales will be greater in the proportion of 8 to 5
and profits will be larger.  Since competitors will not have the alternative of sharing in this
market by setting up for themselves next door or nearby, they will bid for the occupancy of
the better site and thus put into the hands of the landowner all of the extra profits it affords.27
Competition here levels profits by converting a portion of them into rent.  And the tendency
towards a uniform size is modified by the fact that markets are to a degree concentrated at
one spot and not spread over an area which can be divided.
Again, it might seem that if a seller's nearest competitor were at a considerable distance, it
would be almost a matter of indifference which one of a dozen adjacent sites he chose.  And
so it might be, if his trade came entirely from those whose residences were in the vicinity of
his store.  But many of those living nearest to him pass other stores in their daily travels.  He
must choose a site which will be convenient to the goings and comings of as many as
possible, and there may be one or two which are markedly superior in this respect.  Also a
particular location within the district at a street intersection may bring him a large volume of
business from people passing through which he would otherwise miss entirely.  Such factors
as these give varying importance to different sites, even though they be adjacent, the
differences in the advantages they afford being exacted by the owner of the superior site in
every case.  It is obvious that any location giving an unusually large market will have that
market cut into by a competitor if there exists an available site which will allow sufficient
incursions to pay the ordinary rate of profits, so that, except in very congested districts, there
is a definite limit to the volume of business secured by any single seller.  The more "smooth"
the distribution of population – that is, the more alike are the opportunities afforded by a
number of contiguous sites, the smaller will be the variations from the "normal" site.
These irregularities in markets may bring variations in profits instead of in rents.  If a market
is so large as to yield exceptional profits to one merchant and yet not large enough to give
the ordinary rate to two, the seller who happens to get there first may succeed in keeping the
extra profit, providing there are several sites which are about equally attractive.  There could
be no rent in this case beyond that given to the land for other uses, say residential purposes,
for the competition of landowners would reduce to that level.  The higher rate of profits could
not be diminished by a new competitor, for he, as well as the first seller, would lose by his28
entrance.  The forces tending to give surpluses resulting from irregularities of this kind to
landlord or entrepreneur are probably mixed in most cases so that there may be variations in
both rent and profits throughout the area on this account.  Since those negotiating in regard
to a site are characteristically few, there is considerable room for bargaining, and this may
divide the gain or throw it one way or the other.
This concludes our analysis of the spatial factor in complete isolation.  Some of the
tendencies discovered may be observed in real life; others are buried from view by the more
powerful forces which have, of necessity, been ignored in order to isolate this one factor.
Yet, even though buried, they must be of some significance, if it be granted that location is
even  a small part of the whole complex competitive process.  If the results seems abstract
and unreal, they will serve the purpose, at least, of suggesting that the exclusive attention
commonly given to price competition gives conclusions which may be criticised on the same
score.  Where product is differentiated, the theory of prices inevitably tells only a part of the
story – in some cases perhaps only a small part.  The theory of "pure spatial competition" is
indicative of the other forces which are at work.29
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